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WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES
lowed by other jurisdictions. This case is illustrative of one of the
main obstacles to the achievement of that purpose. The court's
reasoning was faulty. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to assume
that other courts will perpetuate a mistake for the sake of con-
formity. As a result, the uniformity of the Code will be further
disrupted unless the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refuses to
recognize this decision, insofar as it relates to the creation of a se-
curity interest, as precedent.
JOHN M. MASSEY
Damages-Rightful Recovery for Wrongful Death-
The Income Tax Factor
Most problems involving the income tax concern a resolution of
whether or not the tax is applicable. There is, however, a problem
that arises because the tax is unquestionably not applicable. Under
the Internal Revenue Code, damage awards for personal injury and
wrongful death are tax exempt.' The recipient of such an award is
allowed to exclude it from his gross income for income tax pur-
poses. Because of this, the court in Brooks v. United States' held
that the amount of damages to be given to the widow and children
of a South Carolina decedent, whose wrongful death was caused
by an agent of the federal government, should be computed so as to
give recognition to this tax saving. This was done by using a net
earnings instead of a gross earnings figure as the measure of future
earnings lost as a result of decedent's death. This position taken by
the court is in the minority in the United States.3
The question of whether to take cognizance of the tax-exempt
status of the award when computing damages is an important one."
"The increase in the amount of damage verdicts . . . and the high
level of income taxes makes the question immediate." 4 It seems
'The Internal Revenue Code expressly exempts from gross income
"the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on
account of personal injuries or sickness." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
104(a) (2). Wrongful death damages are also non-taxable. Rev. Rul.
54-19, 1954-1 Cum. BuLt. 179. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-141(b) (5)
(iv) (Supp. 1967).
'273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967).
'See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1395-96 (1959).
'Note, Income Taxation and Damages for Personal Injuries, 50 Ky. L.J.
601, 601 (1962).
19681
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
natural, therefore, to expect defense attorneys to make attempts to
inject the issue of income tax saving into a case wherever appropri-
ate.5 Even though such awards have been tax-exempt since 1918,0
however, the issue is seldom raised, and many jurisdictions, includ-
ing North Carolina, have never resolved the issue.' In Brooks, the
court was in a position free "to follow the commands of reasonable
justice .... ,,8 because the South Carolina court had not decided the
issue and neither had the circuit court.'
There are logical and seemingly compelling reasons why the
Brooks court took the position it did. The soundness of the court's
position should become apparent when one considers several im-
portant factors. First, the fundamental principle or theory of
damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for the
injury caused. 10 The object is to restore the injured party (meaning
the beneficiaries under the applicable statute in the case of wrongful
death") to the position he would have occupied had there been no
injury (or death). On the other hand, it is never contemplated that
Bums, A Compensation Award for Personal Injury or Wrongful Death
Is Tax Exempt: Should We Tell The Juryf, 14 DE PAuL L. R.Ev. 320, 321
(1965).
' Rev. Act of 1918, § 213(b) (6), 40 Stat. 1066 (now INT. REV. CODE Of
1954, § 104(a) (2)).
'While North Carolina has not decided this question, the measure of
damages used in wrongful death cases could accommodate a deduction of
income taxes from gross expected future earnings. In Journigan v. Little
River Ice Co., 233 N.C. 180, 184-85, 63 S.E.2d 183, 186 (1951), the court
stated the rule as to the appropriate measure of damages to be
the present worth of the net pecuniary value of the life of the de-
ceased to be ascertained by deducting the probable cost of his own
living and usual or ordinary expenses from his probable gross income
which might be expected to be derived from his own exertions during
his life expectancy ... [t]he end of it all being ... to enable the jury
fairly to arrive at the net income from which the deceased might
reasonably be expected to earn from his own exertions, had his death
not ensued .... (emphasis added).
8273 F. Supp. at 632.
For a collection of the state and federal court decisions which have
resolved the issue, see Annot., note 3 supra.
10 C. McCoRmIcrK, DA-MAGES § 137 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Mc-
CORMICK]; James, Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 582 (1956).
" Under the wrongful death statutes of most states the widow and family
are the designated beneficiaries. However, in six states, including Nortl
Carolina, the estate of the decedent is the beneficiary and the action can
be brought only by the personal representative. The widow and family
receive the proceeds in the latter states through distribution of the estate
according to the intestate succession statutes, whether or not the decedent
died intestate. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173, -174 (1949); Comment, Wrong-ful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REv. 402 (1966).
[Vol. 46
WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES
the injured party should be put in a better position than he would
be in had the wrong not been done. The basic idea is, therefore, com-
pensation, not punishment of the defendant or profit to the plaintiff.12
Second, an important element of damages in personal injury
and especially wrongful death cases is the amount of future earn-
ings that will now be lost as a result of the injury or death.'" In the
case of a personal injury, future earning capacity may or may not be
impaired by the injury. If it is, the wrongdoer will be required to
compensate the injured party to the extent of this impairment.
However, in the case of wrongful death, future earning capacity is
totally destroyed, and consequently, this loss of future earnings is
the primary, if not the sole, element of damages recoverable.' 4
Third, "[i]f plaintiff gets in tax-free damages, an amount on
which he would have had to pay taxes if he had gotten it as wages,
the plaintiff is getting more than he lost."' 5 That is, if plaintiff's
recovery is based on lost earnings before taxes which would have
been taxable had there been no injury or death'" and is tax-free,
plaintiff is being over-compensated by the award. This violates the
guiding principle that plaintiff is to be made whole, but is not to
profit.
Even though "reasonable justice" and the logical application of
the underlying principle of damages would seem to require other-
"= Some states allow recovery of punitive damages where the defendant's
act is willful or amounts to gross negligence. MCCORMICI §§ 79, 103. As
early as 1872, the North Carolina court said, in referring to the measure
of damages under the wrongful death statute, that "our statute . . . does
not contemplate solatiwm for the plaintiff nor punishment for the defendant.
It is therefore in the nature of pecuniary demand, the only question being;
how much the plaintiff lost by the death of the injured person ?" [sic] Collier
v. Arrington, 61 N.C. 356, 358 (1872). This language is still quoted with
approval today. See, e.g., Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 398, 146 S.E.2d
425, 428 (1966).3McCoRMcic § 96.
Wrongful death actions in the United States are wholly statutory
creations and the statutes generally provide the measure of damages. The
North Carolina statute provides for such damages as are "a fair and just
compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting from such death." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (1950). The basic item of damages under any such
statute is the loss of future earnings caused by the death.52 F. HARPER & F. JATAES, TORTS § 25.12 at 1326 (1956).
"' "If the income, or a portion thereof, of the person injured or killed
was exempt from liability for income tax, there would be no basis for
deducting income tax on such exempt income in fixing damages for the
destruction of such income." Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1398 (1959). An
example of such tax exempt income is interest received on government
bonds, certain federal pensions, etc.
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wise, the view of most American courts is that the income tax
consequences should not be taken to consideration in computing
damage award. 17 A possible reason is a feeling on the part of the
courts that to allow the damages to be reduced by the income tax
payable on future earnings would be to confer some type of benefit
on the wrongdoer by reducing the damages he has to pay. This is a
distorted view of the problem, however. The question, in reality, is
not one of reducing any damages the defendant has to pay, but one
of accurate assessment of the plaintiff's injury. "No one would
suggest that the defendant should be compelled to pay damages over
and above that which the plaintiff has actually suffered by reason
of the defendant's wrongdoing.
18
Although this feeling might be the real basis for the ma-
jority position, there are several reasons explicitly advanced by
the courts following the majority view. The primary reason is that
future income tax liability is too conjectural."0 Uncertainties exist
as to what decedent's future tax liability would be because of the
possibility of changes in the tax rates, allowable exemptions and
deductions, etc. But, in computing damages, the generally accepted
rule is for the jury or the court to make an estimate, if there is a
reasonable basis for computation, even though the result is only ap-
proximate.20 It would seem better to make a fair estimate of the
future tax liability and reach a reasonably just result, than to ignore
the tax liability completely and reach a result certainly wrong. In
addition, it is no more conjectural to estimate the amount of income
" See Annot., note 3 supra. In England, which has an income tax
provision similar to section 104(a) (2), the House of Lords overruled a
long line of precedent and held that this tax exemption should be considered
in computing damage awards. British Transport Comm'n v. Gourley, [1956]
A.C. 185. For a discussion of the English cases, see Jolowiez, Damages
and Income Tax, 1959 CAmB. L.J. 86.
18 60 W. VA. L. REv. 378, 381 (1958).
1 9Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Givens, 263 F.2d 858, 863 n.4 (5th Cir. 1959);
Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1944); Rouse v. New
York Cent. & St. L. Ry., 349 Ill. App. 139, 110 N.E.2d 266 (1953); Smith
v. Penn R.R., 99 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ohio App. 1950); Dixie Feed & Seed
Co. v. Byrd, 52 Tenn. App. 619, 376 S.W.2d 745 (1963), appeal dismissed,
379 U.S. 15, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 878 (1964).
"25 C.J.S. Davmges § 26(c), at 678-80 (1966). The courts requiring
use of net earnings after taxes, as the appropriate measure of future earn-
ings lost, use estimates and do not require computation of the tax liability
with mathematical precision. See, e.g., O'Conner v. United States, 269 F.2d




taxes that decedent would have paid on his future earnings than it
is to estimate the amount of future earnings he would have made,
how long he would have lived, and other elements of his overall
earning potential that must be and are estimated in computing such
a damage award.21
Another reason often cited is that by making such awards tax
exempt, it was Congress's intent to confer a benefit on injured
persons; to base the future earnings element of a damage award on
net earnings after taxes would be to subvert that intent.22 But Con-
gress clearly did not intend to confer a benefit by making such
awards tax exempt. As the legislative history indicates,23 Congress
made the exemption because it doubted whether tort damages were
"income" within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment. Such
damages are more accurately characterized as a reparation of capital
than as income. The "Congressional intent" argument appears to
be but another example of attributing a non-existent intent to a
legislature to reach an already-decided-upon result."24 Even if it
were Congress's intent to confer a benefit by exempting the award,
exempting the award once obtained from inclusion in gross
income does not necessarily have anything to do with an intention
that the amount of tax that the plaintiff was paying prior to the
injury should or should not be considered by the jury in arriving
at the amount of the award. It merely says that once the proper
measure of damages has been used to arrive at the award, it
will not be included in gross income ... .25
A third reason often cited is the "collateral source doctrine. '26
This doctrine states that compensation received from a source wholly
independent of the wrongdoer will not lessen the damages recover-
able from the wrongdoer. The validity of the doctrine is question-
able in light of the principle that plaintiff is entitled to compensation
"
1Burns, supra note 5, at 324; Moffa v. Perkins Trucking Co., 200 F.
Supp. 183, 188 (D. Conn. 1961).
" Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 151-52, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86
(1955); Dixie Feed & Seed Co. v. Byrd, 52 Tenn. App. 619, 376 S.W.2d
745, 749 (1963), appeal di.nissed, 379 U.S. 15, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 878
(1964); 9 VAND. L. Rav. 543, 549-50 (1956).
2" Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHIO ST.
L.J. 212, 222 (1958). See also Cutler, Taxation of the Proceeds of Litiga-
tion, 57 COLUm. L. REv. 470 (1957); Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1920).
"4 Nordstrom, supra note 24, at 223.
2r Id. at 222.2 69 HARv. L. REv. 1495, 1496 (1956) ; 35 N.C.L. Rav. 401, 404 (1957).
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only to the extent necessary to make him "whole. '2 7 But, even if
one accepts the validity of the doctrine, it would appear to have no
application to the instant problem. The two usual applications of the
doctrine are where funds are paid to an insured injured party, or to
the designated beneficiary in the case of death, by an insurance com-
pany, and where the injured party, or survivors in the case of death,
receives a gift from a third person. An example of the latter is
where a physician renders services as a gratuity. There is no analogy
between receiving a tax exemption and receiving insurance proceeds.
In the latter the insured has contracted and paid premiums in order
to receive the insurance proceeds if the contingency insured against
occurs.2 The reason for including within the doctrine the situation
where one receives collateral compensation as a gratuity is because
it is thought that if the value of the gift were deducted from a dam-
age award, it would frustrate the intent of the donor to confer a
benefit. But that situation is not analogus to the instant problem
since, as was noted above, it was not an intention to confer a bene-
fit which prompted the tax exempt status of damage awards .2
A fourth reason advanced in some cases is that to allow presenta-
tion of evidence as to tax matters would unduly complicate the trial
and cause difficulties in trial administration. It is not denied that
to undertake tax computations would add an element of complexity
to the trial; however, tax experts could be used to assist the court.
"Taxes are complicated, but are they any more complicated than an-
nuity and mortality tables, reduction to present worth or any of a
hundred problems that courts and juries solve every day? ' '81 Besides,
the greater burden is borne by the defense attorney who must pro-
duce and present the evidence. It would seem a better solution to let
him, instead of the court, decide whether the possible savings to be
had are worth the additional effort required.82
" See 77 HAiRv. L. REv. 741 (1964).
" Feldman, Personal Injury Awards: Shoidd Tax Exempt Status Be
Ignored?, 7 ARIz. L. REv. 272, 275 (1966).
2 See note 24, supra, and accompanying text.
30 Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa
1955); Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956); Highshew
v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555 (1956); Pfister v. Cleveland, 96
Ohio App. 185, 113 N.E.2d 366 (1953), appeal dismissed, 159 Ohio St. 580,
112 N.E.2d 657 (1953).
"' Morris & Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal In-
come Tax Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 274, 328 (1960).
" 22OHIo ST. L.J. 225, 228-29 (1961).
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Some courts refuse consideration of the tax consequences with
no discussion of the problem and no real reason given for their
holdding.33 Others hold that the question should be left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge,34 and still others consider the tax factor
when reviewing a damage award to determine if it is excessive.35
The Second Circuit, as noted by the court in Brooks," has adopted
a flexible rule whereby the future earnings element of a damage
award is reduced by the future tax liability where the earnings
in question are in an upper income tax bracket, but no reduction is
made where the earnings fall into a lower bracket.3 7 This approach
has now been approved and adopted by the Seventh Circuit.38 The
reasoning behind the approach is apparently that the taxes which
would be payable when the earnings are in a lower bracket would be
so small that the significance of deducting them would be lost in the
rounding and estimating processes used in computing a damage
award of this nature. While this may be true in the case of a very
small annual income, there would seem to be few cases in which
the tax is so insignificant, since a minimum of 14 per cent of an indi-
vidual's gross earnings is paid in income taxes.
There appears to be a trend developing, at least in the federal
courts, towards requiring a reduction for income taxes. The Brooks
decision is recent evidence of it.3" Although the court in Brooks
" See, e.g., Boston & Me. R.R. v. Talbert, 360 F.2d 286, 291 (1st Cir.
1966).
" See, e.g., United States v. Sommers, 351 F.2d 354, 360 (10th Cir.
1965).
" See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926, 927 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
c' 273 F. Supp. at 631.
T Petition of Marina Mercanto Nicaraguense, S.A., 364 F.2d 118 (2d
Cir. 1966) (annual income of 11,500 dollars; held that deduction here was er-
ror) ; Leroy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965) (annual income of 16,000 dollars; held that
deduction was appropriate); Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen, S.A., 333
F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1964) (annual income of 6,200 dollars; no deduction al-
lowed); Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1963) (annual in-
come of 11-12,000 dollars-held that at this level it was discretionary with the
trial court); McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 34
(2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960) (annual income of 4,800
dollars-held that no deduction was proper).
" Cox v. Northwest Airlines, 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967) (annual
income of 15-20,000 dollars; held that deduction was required).
" For other evidence see Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981(D. Hawaii 1965); Nollenberger v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 734
(S.D. Cal. 1963), petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951, vWdified on
other grounds, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964); Moffa v. Perkins Trucking
1968]
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clearly limited its holding to wrongful death cases, 40 the same reasons
would seem to exist for application of the holding in personal in-
jury cases in which an element of damages recoverable relates to
lost future earnings. But, the reasons are much more compelling in
the case of wrongful death because there the damage award is
primarily, if not entirely, based on loss of future earnings.
The Brooks decision represents a commendable effort to render
"reasonable justice" in spite of many practical problems of tax com-
putation and in the face of the prevailing line of authority. It is
hoped that the decision will prompt courts which have not resolved
the issue to follow suit when the issue is presented, and prompt
others to revaluate their current stand.
PATRICK H. POPE
Damages-The Not So Blessed "Blessed Event"
"[T]he birth of a child may be something less than the 'blessed
event.' . . ."1 said a California Court of Appeals in Custodio v.
Bauer. The context out of which the case arose is not unique but
the attitude of the court differed from similar cases where the courts
adhered to more traditional concepts of the family structure.
Plaintiff in Custodio underwent a salpingectomy, a female
sterilization operation,' after she and her husband decided to limit
their family for health and economic4 reasons. After the operation
Co., 200 F. Supp. 183 (D. Conn. 1961); Meehan v. Central R.R. Co., 181
F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
•273 F. Supp. at 632.
'Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rept. 463, 475 (Ct. App. 1967).
2Id. at 475.
Couples wishing to prevent conception through sterilization usually
have the operation performed on the husband for the reason that a male
sterilization (vasectomy) is a relatively simple procedure that can be per-
formed with a local anesthetic in a doctor's office. A salpingectomy on the
other hand is classified as major surgery and carries with it a certain risk
of death, although the operation is simplified if performed immediately after
child-bearing. However, recanalization, the process whereby the body
naturally overcomes the effects of sterilization, occurs more frequently after
a vasectomy than a salpingectomy. Because recanalization would be a valid
defense to a cause of action based on negligence or malpractice when a
pregnancy results after a sterilization operation, the plaintiff would have
an easier time overcoming the defense in an unsuccessful salpingectomy.
'The apparent economic motivation of the Custodios was implicit in
the court's opinion.
[Vol. 46
